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1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to complement the previous chapter of Mertens
(henceforth [M]), and to present selected recent developments of the theory
that are not covered in it. We limit ourselves to some of the themes addressed
there, without claiming to be exhaustive. In particular, we will not discuss
topics such as algorithms or applications of stochastic games.
Our notations follow those of [M], and we refer to Section 1.1 there for
a general presentation of stochastic games. Unless otherwise speciÞed, the
state space Ω and the action sets Si, i ∈ I, are assumed Þnite.
In this Þnite setup, any undiscounted zero-sum stochastic game has a
value (Mertens and Neyman (1981); see also Theorem 5.1 in [M]). In recent
years, this fundamental result has been extended in several directions: to
non-zero-sum games (do n-player stochastic games have an equilibrium pay-
oﬀ?) and to zero-sum games with imperfect monitoring and/or incomplete
information (do such games have a maxmin and a minmax?).
In Section 1, we report on the result that any two-player stochastic game
has an equilibrium payoﬀ. Section 2 contains the known results for games
with more than two players. These two sections relate to Section 7 in [M].
Section 3 deals with the extension of the theory of zero-sum games to games
with imperfect monitoring in the zero-sum case. Finally, Section 4 contains
new results on games with large state spaces (see Section 7 of [M]) and lists
miscellaneous results.
To facilitate an independent reading of this chapter, we recall now the
deÞnition of equilibrium payoﬀs, and several other notions.
DeÞnition 1 Let Γ be an N-player game. The vector d ∈ RN is an ε-
equilibrium payoﬀ of Γ if there exists a strategy vector σ, and N0 ∈ N , such
that, for n ≥ N0:
1
1. kγn(σ)− dk ≤ ε;
2. σ is an ε-equilibrium of Γn.
In this deÞnition, Γn is the n-stage version of Γ. We then say that σ is
an ε-equilibrium; d is an equilibrium payoﬀ if it is an ε-equilibrium payoﬀ,
for each ε > 0. Given ε0 > ε > 0, an ε-equilibrium is also an ε0-equilibrium
in all discounted games, provided the discount factor is close enough to zero.
We refer to Sorin (1992) for a discussion of this concept.
A strategy is stationary (or stationary Markov) if the distribution used
to select an action depends only on the current state of the game. Thus,
a stationary strategy xi of player i can be identiÞed with an element (xi
ω
)ω
of ∆(Si)Ω, where xi
ω
is the lottery used by player i in state ω. Stationary
strategies will be denoted by Latin letters, and arbitrary strategies by Greek
letters. Given a proÞle x of (stationary) strategies, the sequence (ωn)n∈N of
states is a Markov chain. The mixed extensions of the stage payoﬀ g and of
the transition probability P will also be denoted by g and P. A perturbation
of a stationary strategy xi = (xi
ω
) is a stationary strategy exi = (exi
ω
) such
that the support of xi
ω
is a subset of the support of exi
ω
, for each ω ∈ Ω.
2 Two-player non-zero-sum games
The purpose of this section is to present the main ideas of the proof of the
next theorem, due to Vieille (2000a,2000b). Several tools of potential use for
subsequent studies are introduced.
Theorem 2 Every two-player stochastic game has an equilibrium payoﬀ.
An overview
W.l.o.g., we assume that the stage payoﬀ function (g1, g2) of the game
satisÞes g1 < 0 < g2. The basic idea is to devise an ε-equilibrium proÞle
that takes the form of a stationary-like strategy vector σ, supplemented by
threats of indeÞnite punishment.
We give a heuristic description of σ. The proÞle σ essentially coincides
with a stationary proÞle x¯. For the Markov chain deÞned by x¯, consider
the partition of the state space Ω into recurrent sets and transient states.
(This partition depends on x¯, since the transitions depend on actions.) The
recurrent sets are classiÞed into solvable and controlled sets. The solvable sets
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are those recurrent sets C for which the average payoﬀ induced by x¯ starting
from C is high for both players; the controlled sets are the remaining sets. In
each controlled set C, σ plays a perturbation of x¯, designed so that the play
leaves C in Þnite time. In the other states, σ coincides with x¯. Given σ, the
play eventually reaches some solvable set (and remains within it). Whenever
the play is in a controlled or solvable set, each player monitors the behavior
of the other player, using statistical tests.
This description is oversimpliÞed and inaccurate in some fairly important
respects, such as the fact that we use a generalized notion of recurrent set,
called a communicating set.
The construction of σ consists of two independent steps: Þrst, to construct
the solvable sets and some controlled sets, and reduce the existence problem
to a class of recursive games; second, to deal with the class of recursive
games.1
Some terminology
Before proceeding with these steps, we shall provide a formal deÞnition
of the notions of communicating, solvable and controlled sets.
DeÞnition 3 A subset C is communicating given a proÞle x if, given any
ω,ω0 ∈ C, there exists a perturbation ex of x for which, starting from ω, the
probability of reaching ω0 without leaving C equals one.
In particular, C is closed given x: P (C|ω, xω) = 1, for each ω ∈ C. Note
that any recurrent set for x is communicating given x.
It is convenient to have the initial state of the game vary. Given an initial
state ω, we denote by (v1(ω), v2(ω)) the threat point of the game.2 If, facing
a stationary strategy x2, player 1 is to play s1 in state ω, and to be punished
immediately afterwards, his best future payoﬀ is measured by the expectation
E [v1|ω, s1, x2
ω
] of v1 under P (·|ω, s1, x2
ω
). For C ⊆ Ω, and given x2, we set
H1(x2, C) = max
s1∈S1
max
ω∈C
E
£
v1|ω, s1, x2
ω
¤
,
which somehow measures the threat point for player 1, against x2, and given
that the play visits all states of C. The deÞnition of H2(x1, C) is the sym-
metric one. It is easily seen that H1(x2, C) ≥ maxC v
1(ω).
1A game is recursive if the payoﬀ function is identically zero outside absorbing states.
Recursive games were introduced by Everett (1957).
2By deÞnition, vi (ω) is the value of the zero-sum stochastic game deduced from Γ,
where the other player minimizes player is payoﬀ.
3
Let a proÞle x, and a recurrent set R for x be given. The (long-run)
average payoﬀ Eω,x [g¯n] exists for each ω and is independent of ω ∈ R. We
denote it by γR(x).
The deÞnition builds upon a notion Þrst introduced by Thuijsman and
Vrieze (1991).
DeÞnition 4 A set C ⊆ Ω is solvable if, for some proÞle x, the following
two conditions are fulÞlled:
1. C is a communicating set given x.
2. There exists a point γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈ co {γR(x), R recurrent subset of C}
such that
(γ1, γ2) ≥ (H1(x2, C), H2(x1, C)). (1)
This concept is motivated by the following observation. The communica-
tion requirement ensures that the players are able to visit the recurrent sub-
sets of C cyclically by playing appropriate small perturbations of x. Given
the interpretation of (H1(x2, C), H2(x1, C)) as a threat point, the inequal-
ity (1) may be interpreted as an individual rationality requirement. By a
standard proof, one can show that γ is an equilibrium payoﬀ of the game,
provided the initial state belongs to C.
The set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the game does not increase when one
replaces each state in a solvable set C by an absorbing state, with payoﬀ the
vector γ associated with C. Therefore, we assume throughout the chapter
that all such sets coincide with absorbing states.
We now describe controlled sets. A pair (ω, si) ∈ C × Si is a unilateral
exit of player i from C ⊆ Ω given a strategy x−i if P (C|ω, si, x−i
ω
) < 1.
A triplet (ω, s1, s2) ∈ C × S1 × S2 is a joint exit from C given x if
P (C|ω, s1, s2) < 1, and none of the pairs (ω, s1) and (ω, s2) is a unilateral
exit.
DeÞnition 5 Let C ⊆ Ω be a communicating set given a proÞle x.
The set C is controlled by player i if there is a unilateral exit (ω, si) of
player i (from C given x−i) such that
(E
£
v1|ω, si, x−i
ω
¤
, E
£
v2|ω, si, x−i
ω
¤
) ≥ (H1(x2, C), H2(x1, C)). (2)
The set C is jointly controlled if there exists
γ ∈ co
©
E
£
v|ω, s1, s2
¤
, (ω, s1, s2) joint exit from C given x
ª
such that
γ ≥ (H1(x2, C), H2(x1, C)).
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The rationale behind this deÞnition runs as follows. Let C ⊆ Ω be a set
controlled by player 1, and let x, (ω, s1) ∈ C × S1 be the associated proÞle
and exit. Assume for simplicity that P (C|ω, s1, x2
ω
) = 0.
Assume that we are given for each ω0 /∈ C an equilibrium payoﬀ γ(ω0)
for the game starting at ω0. Then E [γ(·)|ω, s1, x2
ω
] is an equilibrium payoﬀ of
the game, for every initial state in C.
We give few hints for this fact. By using appropriate perturbations of
x, the players are able to come back repeatedly to ω without leaving C. If
player 1 slightly perturbs x1 by s1 in each of these visits, the play leaves
C in Þnite time and the exit state is distributed according to P (·|ω, s1, x2
ω
).
Given such a scenario, it takes many visits to ω before the plays leaves C.
Hence player 1 may check the empirical choices of player 2 in these stages.
Condition (2) implies that
 player 2 prefers playing x2 in state ω to playing any other distribution
and being punished; he prefers waiting for player 1 to use the exit
(ω, s1) to using any of his own exits, since
E
£
γ2(·)|ω, s1, x2
ω
¤
≥ E
£
v2(·)|ω, s1, x2
ω
¤
≥ H2(x1, C).
 player 1 prefers using the exit (ω, s1) (and getting E [γ1(·)|ω, s1, x2
ω
])
to using any other exit and being punished; he prefers using the exit
(ω, s1) to using no exit at all and being punished.
A similar property holds for jointly controlled sets.
A reduction to positive recursive games
To any controlled set C, we associate in a natural way a distribution µC
of exit, i.e., a distribution such that µC(C) < 1. If C is controlled by player
i, let µC = P (·|ω, s
i, x−i
ω
) (with the notations of DeÞnition 5). If C is jointly
controlled, let µC be a convex combination of the distributions P (·|ω, s
1, s2),
((ω, s1, s2) joint exit from C given x) such that EµC [v] = γ.
Given a controlled set C, with its distribution µC of exit, deÞne a changed
game ΓC by changing the transitions in each state of C to µC. For a collection
C of disjoint controlled sets, the changed game ΓC is obtained by applying
this procedure to each element of C.
In general, there is no inclusion between the equilibrium payoﬀ sets of the
original and the changed games Γ and ΓC. The goal of the next proposition,
which is the main result in Vieille (2000a), is to exhibit a family C such that:
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(i) such an inclusion holds and (ii) the changed game ΓC has very speciÞc
properties.
Remember that, by assumption, the solvable sets of Γ coincide with the
absorbing states of Γ.
Proposition 6 There exists a family C of disjoint controlled sets with changed
game ΓC having the following property: for each strategy x
1 there exists a
strategy x2 such that (i) the play reaches an absorbing state in Þnite time;
(ii) for each initial state ω1, the expected termination payoﬀ to player 2 is at
least v2(ω1).
Two remarks are in order. First, by (i), there must exist an absorbing state
in Γ. The existence of solvable sets is therefore a corollary to the proposition.
Next, the two games Γ and ΓC need not have the same threat point v. The
value v2(ω1) that appears in the statement is that of Γ.
Let C be given by this proposition. Let Γ0
C
be the game obtained from ΓC,
after setting the payoﬀ function to zero in each non-absorbing state.
Note that Γ0
C
is a recursive game such that:
P.1 all absorbing payoﬀs to player 2 are positive;
P.2 player 2 can force the play to reach an absorbing state in Þnite time:
for any proÞle x = (x1, x2) where x2 is fully mixed, the play reaches an
absorbing state in Þnite time, whatever the initial state.
Property P.1 is a consequence of the assumption g2 > 0; property P.2
follows from Proposition 6 (i). Recursive games that satisfy both properties
P.1 and P.2 are called positive recursive games.
It can be shown3 that each equilibrium payoﬀ of Γ0
C
is also an equilibrium
payoﬀ of the initial game Γ. The main consequence of Proposition 6 is thus
that one is led to study positive recursive games.
Existence of equilibrium payoﬀs in positive recursive games
We now present some of the ideas in the proof of the result:
Proposition 7 Every (two-player) recursive game which satisÞes P.1 and
P.2 has an equilibrium payoﬀ.
3This is where the assumption g1 < 0 < g2 comes into play.
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In zero-sum recursive games, ε-optimal strategies do exist (Everett (1957)).
In non-zero-sum positive recursive games, stationary ε-equilibria need not ex-
ist. For instance, in the game4
ω1½
1
5
(−1, 3)∗
4
5
ω2
ω0
ω0 1, 1
∗
ω1
ω0 2, 2
∗
ω2
Example 1
one can check that no stationary proÞle x exists that would be an ε-equilibrium
for every initial state.
Throughout this section, take Γ to be a Þxed positive recursive game.
The basic idea of the proof is to approximate the game by a sequence of
constrained games. For each ε > 0, let Γε be the game in which player 2
is constrained to use stationary strategies that put a weight of at least ε
on each single action. Player 1 is unconstrained. A crucial feature of Γε is
that the average payoﬀ function, deÞned for stationary proÞles x by γ(x) =
limn→∞ γn(x), is continuous.
Next, one deÞnes Bε as an analog of the best-reply correspondence on the
space of constrained stationary proÞles. This correspondence is well-behaved
so that: (i) it has a Þxed point xε for each ε > 0, and (ii) the graph of
Þxed points (as a function of ε) is semialgebraic, hence there is a selection
ε 7→ xε of Þxed points such that x
i,ω
ε
(si) has an expansion in Puiseux series
in the neighborhood of zero (see [M], Section 4). This can be shown to imply
that the limits x0 = limε→0 xε and γ = limε→0 γ(xε) do exist. Finally, one
proves that, for each ω, γω is an equilibrium payoﬀ for Γ starting in ω; an
associated ε-equilibrium consists in playing a history-dependent perturbation
of x0, sustained by appropriate threats.
Solan (2000) proves that, by taking the usual best-reply map for Bε , the
program sketched in the previous paragraph works for games in which there
are no more than two non-absorbing states, but not for more general games.
Before deÞningBε in greater detail, we assume we have an intuitive notion
of what it is. Given a Þxed point xε of Bε, we begin by describing the
asymptotic behavior of the play, as ε goes to zero. This discussion will point
out some of the requirements that a satisfactory deÞnition of Bε should meet.
4In this example, each entry contains only the transitions. Transitions are deterministic
except in state ω0, when player 1 plays the Bottom row; the play then moves, with
probability 45 , to the state ω2, and to an absorbing state with payoﬀ (−1, 3) otherwise.
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For each ε > 0, given xε = (x
1
ε
, x2
ε
), the play reaches an absorbing state in
Þnite time, since x2
ε
is fully mixed and since Γ satisÞes P.2. As ε goes to zero,
the probability of some actions may vanish, and there may exist recurrent
sets for x0 that contain non-absorbing states.
DeÞne a binary relation→ on the non-absorbing states by ω → ω0 if and
only if the probability (starting from ω, computed for xε) that the play visits
ω0 converges to one as ε goes to zero. DeÞne an equivalence relation by
ω ∼ ω0 ⇔ ( ω → ω0 and ω0 → ω).
The diﬀerent equivalence classes deÞne a partition of the set of non-absorbing
states. Note that a transient state (given x0) may be included in a larger
equivalence class, or constitute an equivalence class by itself. One can check
that each class is either a transient state, or a set that is communicating
given x0 = limε→0 xε.
Consider an equivalence class C of the latter type, and let ε > 0 be
Þxed. Since the play reaches the set of absorbing states in Þnite time, C is
transient under xε. Hence, given an initial state in C, the distribution Q
ε
C of
the exit state5 from C is well-deÞned. This distribution usually depends on
the initial state in C. Since (xε) has a Puiseux expansion in the neighborhood
of zero, it can be shown that the limit QC = limε→0Q
ε
C exists. Moreover,
it is independent of the initial state in C. Next, the distribution QC has a
natural decomposition as a convex combination of the distributions
P (·|ω, si, x−i0 ), where (ω, s
−i) is a unilateral exit of C given x0
and
P (·|ω, s1, s2), where (ω, s1, s2) is a joint exit from C given x0.
It is straightforward to observe that the limit payoﬀ vector γ(·) = limε→0 γ(·, xε)
is such that, for ω ∈ C, γ(ω) coincides with the expectation EQC [γ(·)] of γ(·)
under QC.
The main issue in designing the family (Bε)ε of maps is to ensure that C
is somehow controlled, in the following sense. Assuming that γ(ω0) is an
equilibrium payoﬀ for the game starting from ω0 /∈ C, it should be the
case that γ(ω) = EQC [γ(·)] is an equilibrium payoﬀ starting from ω ∈
C. The main diﬃculty arises when the decomposition of QC involves two
unilateral exits (ω¯, s¯2), (eω, es2) of player 2, such that E
£
γ2(·)|ω¯, x20,ω¯, s¯
2
¤
>
5Which is deÞned to be the actual current state, at the Þrst stage for which the current
stage does not belong to C.
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E
£
γ2(·)|eω, x2
0,eω, es
2
¤
. Indeed, in such a case, player 2 is not indiﬀerent be-
tween the two exits, and would favor using the exit (ω¯, s¯2).
The approach in Vieille (2000b) is similar to proper ε-equilibrium. Given
x = (x1, x2), one measures for each pair (ω, s2) ∈ Ω×B the opportunity cost
of using s2 in state ω by maxS2 E [γ
2(x)|ω, x1
ω
, ·]−E [γ2(x)|ω, x2
ω
, s2] (it thus
compares the expected continuation payoﬀ by playing s2 with the maximum
achievable). B2
ε
(x) consists of those x¯2 such that whenever the pair (ω, s2) has
a higher opportunity cost than (ω¯, s¯2), then the probability x¯2
ω
(s2) assigned
by x¯2 to s2 at state ω is quite small compared with x¯2
ω¯
(s¯2). One then sets
Bε(x) = B
1
ε
(x)×B2
ε
(x), where B1
ε
is the best-reply map of player 1.
We conclude by giving a few stylized properties that show how to deal
with the diﬃculties mentioned above. Since both exits (ω¯, s¯2) and (eω, es2)
have a positive contribution to QC, it follows that eω is visited (inÞnitely, as
ε goes to zero) more often than ω¯, and also that, in some sense, facing x10,
player 2 can not reach ω¯ from eω, hence communication from eω to ω¯ can be
blocked by player 1. Thus player 1 is able to inßuence the relative frequency
of visits in eω and ω¯, hence the relative weight of the two exits (ω¯, s¯2), (eω, es2).
It must therefore be the case that player 1 is indiﬀerent between the two exits
(eω, es2) and (ω¯, s¯2). The ε-equilibrium proÞle will involve a lottery performed
by player 1, who chooses which of the two exits (if any) should be used to
leave C.
Comments
1- The lack of symmetry between the two players may appear some-
what unnatural. However, it is not an artifact of the proof since symmetric
stochastic games need not have a symmetric ε-equilibrium. For instance, the
only equilibrium payoﬀs of the symmetric game
0, 0 2, 1∗
1, 2∗ 1, 1∗
are (1, 2) and (2, 1).
2- All the complexity of the ε-equilibrium proÞles lies in the punishment
phase.
3- The main characteristics of the ε-equilibrium proÞle (solvable sets,
controlled sets, exit distributions, stationary proÞles that serve as a basis
for the perturbations) are independent of ε. The value of ε > 0 has an
inßuence on the statistical tests used to detect potential deviations, the size
of the perturbations used to travel within a communicating set, and the
speciÞcation of the punishment strategies.
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4- The above proof has many limitations. Neither of the two parts extends
to games with more than two players. The ε-equilibrium proÞles have no
subgame perfection property. Finally, in zero-sum games, the value exists
as soon as payoﬀs are observed (in addition to the current state). For non-
zero-sum games, the tests check past choices. Whether an equilibrium exists
when only the vector of current payoﬀs is publicly observed, is not known.
5- These ε-equilibrium proÞles involve two phases: after a solvable set
is reached, players accumulate payoﬀs (and check for deviations); before a
solvable set is reached, they care only about transitions (about which solv-
able set will eventually be reached). This distinction is similar to the one
which appears in the proof of existence of equilibrium payoﬀs for games with
one-sided information (Simon et al. (1995)), where a phase of information
revelation is followed by payoﬀ accumulation. This (rather vague) similarity
suggests that a complete characterization of equilibrium payoﬀs for stochastic
games would intertwine the two aspects in a complex way, by analogy with
the corresponding characterization for games with incomplete information
(Hart (1985)).
6- In Example 1, the following holds: given an initial state ω, and ε > 0,
the game starting at ω has a stationary ε-equilibrium. Whether this holds
for any positive recursive game is not known.
3 Games with more than two players
It is as yet unknown whether n-player stochastic games always have an equi-
librium payoﬀ. We describe a partial result for three-player games, and ex-
plain what is speciÞc to this number of players.
The Þrst contribution is due to Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze (1997), who
analyzed Example 2 below.
0, 0, 0 0, 1, 3∗
1, 3, 0∗ 1, 0, 1∗
3, 0, 1∗ 1, 1, 0∗
0, 1, 1∗ 0, 0, 0∗
Example 2
This example falls in the class of repeated games with absorbing states: there
is a single non-absorbing state (in other words, the current state changes once
at most during any play). We follow customary notations (see [M]). Players
1, 2 and 3 choose respectively a row, a column and a matrix. Starting from
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the non-absorbing state, the play moves immediately to an absorbing state,
unless the move combination (Top,Left,Left) is played.
In this example, the set of equilibrium payoﬀs coincides with those convex
combinations (γ1, γ2, γ3) of the three payoﬀs (1, 3, 0), (0, 1, 3), (3, 0, 1) such
that (γ1, γ2, γ3) ≥ (1, 1, 1), and γi = 1 for at least one player i. Corre-
sponding ε-equilibrium proÞles involve cyclic perturbations of the proÞle of
stationary (pure) strategies (Top,Left,Left). Rather than describe this ex-
ample in greater detail, we discuss a class of games below that includes it.
This example gave the impetus for the study of three-player games with
absorbing states (see Zamir (1992), Section 5 for some motivation concerning
this class of games). The next result is due to Solan (1999).
Theorem 8 Every three-player repeated game with absorbing states has an
equilibrium payoﬀ.
Sketch of the Proof: Solan deÞnes an auxiliary stochastic game in
which the current payoﬀ eg(x) is deÞned to be the (coordinatewise) minimum
of the current vector payoﬀ g(x) and of the threat point.6 He then uses
Vrieze and Thuijsmans (1989) idea of analyzing the asymptotic behavior
(as λ → 0) of a family (xλ)λ>0 of stationary equilibria of the auxiliary λ-
discounted game.
The limits limλ→0 xλ and limλ→0 γλ(xλ) do exist, up to a subsequence.
If it happens that limλ→0 γλ(xλ) = γ(limλ→0 xλ), then x = limλ→0 xλ is a
stationary equilibrium of the game. Otherwise, it must be the case that the
nature of the Markov chain deÞned by xλ changes at the limit: for λ > 0
close enough to zero, the non-absorbing state is transient for xλ, whereas it
is recurrent for x.
In this case, the limit payoﬀ limλ→0 γλ(xλ) can be written as a convex
combination of the non-absorbing payoﬀ eg(x) (which by construction is domi-
nated by the threat point) and of payoﬀs received in absorbing states reached
when perturbing x. By using combinatorial arguments, Solan constructs an
ε-equilibrium proÞle that coincides with cyclic perturbations of x, sustained
by appropriate threats.
In order to illustrate Example 2 above and Solans proof, we focus on the
following games, called quitting games. Each player has two actions: quit
and continue: Si = {ci, qi}. The game ends as soon as at least one player
chooses to quit (if no player ever quits, the payoﬀ is zero). For simplicity, we
assume that a player receives 1 if he is the only one to quit.
6In particular, the current payoﬀ is not multilinear.
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A stationary strategy is characterized by the probability of quitting, i.e.,
by a point in [0, 1]. Hence the space of stationary proÞles is the unit cube
D = [0, 1]3, with (0, 0, 0) being the unique non-absorbing proÞle.
Assume Þrst that, for some player, say player 1, the payoﬀ vector γ(q1, c2, c3)
is of the form (1,+,+), where the + sign stands for a number higher than
or equal to one. Then the following stationary proÞle is an ε-equilibrium,
provided α is small enough: player 1 quits with probability α, player 2 and
3 continue with probability 1.
We now rule out such conÞgurations. For ε > 0 small, consider the con-
strained game where the players are restricted to stationary proÞles x that
satisfy
P
3
i=1 x
i ≥ ε, i.e., the points below the triangle T = {x ∈ D, x1 + x2 + x3 = ε}
are chopped oﬀ D (see Figure 1).
If it happens that at every point x ∈ T , one has γi(x) < 1 for some7
i, then any stationary equilibrium of the constrained game (which exists by
standard Þxed-point arguments) is a stationary equilibrium of the true game.
It therefore remains to discuss the case where γ(x0) = (+,+,+) for some
x0 ∈ T . Given x ∈ T , the probability that two players quit simultaneously
is of order ε2, hence γ is close on T to the linear function
x1γ(q1, c−1) + x2γ(q2, c−2) + x3γ(q3, c−3).
Since γ1(q1, c−1) = 1, and γ1(x0) ≥ 1, it must be that γ
1(q2, c−2) ≥ 1 or
γ1(q3, c−3) ≥ 1. Similar observations hold for the other two players.
If γ(q1, c−1) were of the form (1,−,−), one would have γ(q2, c−2) =
(+, 1,+) or γ(q3, c−3) = (+,+, 1), which has been ruled out. Up to a permu-
tation of players 2 and 3, one can assume γ(q1, c−1) = (1,+,−). The signs of
γ(q2, c−2) and γ(q3, c−3) are then given by (−, 1,+) and (+,−, 1).
7Player i would then rather quit than let x be played. In geometric terms, the best-reply
map points inwards on T .
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Draw the triangle T together with the straight lines {x, γi(x) = 1}, for
i = 1, 2, 3.
The set of x ∈ T for which γ(x) = (+,+,+) is the interior of the triangle
(ABC) delineated by these straight lines. We now argue that for each x on
the edges of (ABC), γ(x) is an equilibrium payoﬀ. Consider for instance
γ(A) and let σ be the strategy proÞle that plays cyclically: according to the
stationary proÞle (η, 0, 0) during N1 stages, then according to (0, η, 0) and
(0, 0, η) during N2 and N3 stages successively. Provided N1,N2, N3 are prop-
erly chosen, the payoﬀ induced by σ coincides with γ(A). Provided η is small
enough, in the Þrst N1 stages (resp. next N2, next N3 stages), the continu-
ation payoﬀ8 moves along the segment joining γ(A) to γ(B) (resp., γ(B) to
γ(C), γ(C) to γ(A)). Therefore, σ is an ε-equilibrium proÞle associated with
γ(A).
Clearly, this approach relies heavily upon the geometry of the three-
dimensional space. Note that, for such games, there is a stationary ε-
equilibrium or an equilibrium payoﬀ in the convex hull of {γ(qi, c−i), i = 1, 2, 3}.
Solan and Vieille (2000b) devised a four-player quitting game for which this
property does not hold. Whether or not n-player quitting games do have
equilibrium payoﬀs remains an intriguing open problem.9
8I.e., the undiscounted payoﬀ obtained in the subgame starting at that stage.
9A partial existence result is given in Solan and Vieille (2000b).
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An important trend in the literature is to identify classes of stochastic
games for which there exist ε-equilibrium proÞles (see for instance Thuijsman
and Raghavan (1997)) that exhibit a simple structure (stationary, Markovian,
etc.).
To conclude, we mention that the existence of (extensive-form) correlated
equilibrium payoﬀs is known (Solan and Vieille (2000a)).
Theorem 9 Every stochastic game has an (autonomous) extensive-form cor-
related equilibrium payoﬀ.
The statement of the result refers to correlation devices that send (pri-
vate) signals to the players at each stage. The distribution of the signals sent
in stage n depends on the signal sent in stage n− 1, and is independent of
any other information.
Idea of the proof: The Þrst step is to construct a good strategy
proÞle, meaning a proÞle that yields all players a high payoﬀ, and by which
no player can proÞt by a unilateral deviation that is followed by an indeÞnite
punishment. One then constructs a correlation device that imitates this
proÞle: the device chooses for each player a recommended action according
to the probability distribution given by the proÞle. It also reveals to all
players what its recommendations were in the previous stage. In this way, a
deviation is detected immediately.
4 Zero-sum games with imperfect monitoring
These are games where, at any stage, each player receives a private signal
which depends, possibly randomly, on the choices of the players (see Sorin
(1992), Section 5.2 for the model). In constrast to (complete information)
repeated games, dropping the perfect monitoring assumption already has
important implications in the zero-sum case.
It is instructive to consider Þrst the following striking example (Coulomb
(1999)):
L M R
T 100 1∗ 0∗
B 100 0 1
Example 3
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When player 1 plays B, he receives the signal a if either the L orM column
was chosen by player 2, and the signal b otherwise. The signals to player 2,
and to player 1 when he plays the T row, are irrelevant for what follows.
Note that the right-hand side
1
∗ 0∗
0 1
of the game coincides (up to an
aﬃne transformation on payoﬀs) with the Big Match (see [M], Section 2),
which was shown to have the value 1
2
. We now show that the addition of
the L column, which is apparently dominated, has the eﬀect of bringing the
maxmin down to zero.
Indeed, let σ be any strategy of player 1, and let y be the stationary
strategy of player 2 that plays L and R with probabilities 1 − ε and ε,
respectively. Denote by θ the absorbing stage, i.e. the Þrst stage in which
one of the two move proÞles (T,M) or (T,R) is played.
If Pσ,y(θ < +∞) = 1, then γn(σ, y)→ ε as n goes to inÞnity. Otherwise,
choose an integer N large enough so that Pσ,y(N ≤ θ < +∞) < ε
2. In
particular,
Pσ,y(θ ≥ N, player 1 ever plays T after stage N) ≤ ε.
Let y0 be the stationary strategy of player 2 that plays M and R with prob-
abilities 1− ε and ε, respectively, and call τ the strategy that coincides with
y up to stage N , and with y0 afterwards. Since (B,L) and (B,M) yield the
same signal to player 1, the distributions induced by (σ, y) and by (σ, τ) on
sequences of signals to player 1 coincide up to the Þrst stage after stage N ,
in which player 1 plays T .
Therefore, Pσ,τ -almost surely,
g¯n → 0 if θ < N
g¯n → 1− ε if N ≤ θ < +∞
g¯n → ε if θ = +∞.
Since Pσ,y(N ≤ θ < +∞) ≤ ε, limn→+∞Eσ,τ [g¯n] ≤ 2ε. Thus, player 2 can
defend zero.
Since player 1 clearly guarantees 0 and can defend 1
2
, the game has no
value and the maxmin is equal to zero.
The following theorem is due to Coulomb (1995,1999).
Theorem 10 Every zero-sum repeated game with absorbing states and par-
tial monitoring has a maxmin.
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Sketch of the proof: Following the steps of Kohlberg (1974), the
maxmin is Þrst shown to exist for so-called generalized Big Match games,
then for all games with absorbing states.
The class of generalized Big Match games includes Example 3. Player 1
has only two actions, T and B, while the action set S2 of player 2 is parti-
tioned into S¯2 and eS2. For s2 ∈ S¯2, transitions and payoﬀs are independent
of s1 ∈ {T,B}. For s2 ∈ eS2, the probability of reaching an absorbing state is
positive given (T, s2) and equals zero given (B, s2). Coulomb (1999) charac-
terizes the maxmin for such games; as in Example 3, it depends only on the
signal structure to player 1, given the action B.
As might be expected, the maxmin is quite sensitive to the signalling
structure. For instance, consider again Example 3. Assume that the signal a
associated with the entry (B,M) is replaced by a random device that sends
the signal a with probability 1− η, and the signal a0 otherwise. If a0 = b, the
maxmin is still close to zero for η small (the M column is indistinguishable
from a convex combination of the L and R columns). If a0 6= b, the maxmin
is equal to 1
2
, whatever the value of η > 0.
Let Γ be any game with absorbing states. To any pair x1, ex1 of distri-
butions over S1 is associated a (Þctitious) generalized Big Match Γx1 ,ex1 , in
which the B and T rows correspond, respectively, to the mixed moves x1
and x1, slightly perturbed by ex1. It is shown by Coulomb (1995) that the
maxmin of Γ is equal to the supremum over (x1, ex1) of the maxmin of the
auxiliary game Γx1 ,ex1 . The diﬃcult part is to show that player 2 can defend
such a quantity.
5 Stochastic games with large state space
Consider Þrst a stochastic game with countable state space Ω and Þnite ac-
tions sets S1 and S2. Maitra and Sudderth (1992) prove that, with lim supn→+∞ gn
as the payoﬀ function for the inÞnite game,10 the game has a value. This
result was considerably extended by Martin (1998). Let Ω, S1 and S2 be
endowed with the discrete topology, and the set H∞ of plays be given the
product topology. Let the payoﬀ function of the inÞnite game be any Borel
function f on H∞. (Martin does not deal with stochastic games, but, as ar-
gued in Maitra and Sudderth (2000), the extension to stochastic games is
immediate.)
Theorem 11 The game with payoﬀ function f has a value.
10This payoﬀ function includes many cases of interest, including discounted stochastic
games.
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See Martin (1998) for the proof. The proof relies on another theorem of
Martin (1975) for games of perfect information. We also refer to Maitra and
Sudderth (2000) for an introduction to the proof.
We conclude by citing miscellaneous results. In stochastic games with in-
complete information on one side, a lottery chooses at stage 0 the stochastic
game to be played, and only player 1 is informed. Such games may be an-
alyzed through an auxiliary stochastic game in which the current posterior
held by player 2 on the true game being played is part of the state vari-
able. It is conjectured that the maxmin exists and coincides with limn→∞ vn
and limλ→0 vλ. The basic intuition is that the maxmin should coincide with
the value of the auxiliary game, which is not known to exist (see Mertens
(1987)). Only scattered results are available so far. This has been veriÞed
by Sorin (1984) for games of the Big Match type, and by Rosenberg and
Vieille (2000) when the possible stochastic games are recursive. For games
with absorbing states, it is known that limn→∞ vn = limλ→0 vλ (Rosenberg
(2000)).
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